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Abstract
Using linear and nonlinear correlations, copulas, quantile dependence and lower tail
dependence, we find that (1) equity markets of the advanced European Union (EU) countries
comove more closely with each other than with the peripheral economies, (2) comovements
with non-EU countries are lower, (3) relative comovement structure before, during, and after
the global financial crisis has been very stable, and (4) the level of comovements remained
virtually the same between the crisis and post-crisis periods. Our results are robust to controlling
∗Corresponding author: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC
20549; Phone: 202-551-6434; E-mail: orlova@sec.gov.
We thank conference participants at the 2016 Financial Management Association and our discussant
Fernando Moreira, and two anonymous referees for immensely helpful comments. We also thank Andrew
Patton and James P. LeSage for sharing their MATLAB codes for computing quantile dependence. The
authors of this paper are responsible for any errors or omissions. The Securities and Exchange Commission,
as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its
employees. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the Commission or the authors’ colleagues on the staff of the Commission.
C© 2019 The Eastern Finance Association 5
6 M. A. Goldstein et al./The Financial Review 54 (2019) 5–56
for Fama-French, U.S. and global risk factors, as well as monetary policy, market interest rates,
exchange rates, and uncertainty.
Keywords: financial interdependence, comovements, European stock markets, PIIGS, Brexit,
copulas, global financial crisis
JEL Classifications: C14, F30, F37, G10, G15
1. Introduction
The vote in the United Kingdom (UK) on June 23, 2016, to leave the European
Union (EU) raised a variety of questions, including how and what EU membership
affects. Although the UK’s exit from the EU will affect a variety of trade and immi-
gration issues, the Brexit vote (see, e.g., The Economist, 2016) also raises interesting
questions about how Eurozone and EU membership affects comovements across not
just the labor and goods markets but financial markets as well. This is especially
pertinent since the UK is (still) a member of the EU but did not adopt the euro as
its currency, unlike many other EU members such as Germany and France. As eq-
uity markets tend to aggregate the effects of goods, labor, foreign exchange, interest
rates and capital markets, an important question is how EU membership (and non-
membership) affects equity market comovements among advanced and nonadvanced
economies. Compounding these issues was the adoption of the euro as a common
currency on January 1, 1999, which removed some diversification effects due to
currency movements across Eurozone countries. Even so, notable differences remain
across countries that use the euro.
In this paper, we examine the interrelationships among the core and periphery
EU and Eurozone countries, and those of the UK and beyond. We try to answer three
main research questions. First, how are comovements among European stock markets
affected by the EU affiliation versus adoption of the euro? Second, do the European
periphery economies’ stock markets comove more or less with each other than with
the stock markets of the core European countries? Third, how does the structure of
stock market comovements change between tranquil and crisis periods?
Overall, we find that the core EU and Eurozone countries comove more with each
other than any other group, and that the periphery EU and Eurozone countries comove
more with the core than with each other. As the use of the euro and membership in the
EU is removed, the stock market comovements become reduced. Interestingly, using
a variety of statistical techniques, we find that the relative structure of comovements
across countries prior to the crisis remained relatively constant before, during, and
after the crisis. Notably, the absolute magnitude of the comovements increased during
the financial crisis but did not diminish after the crisis. These effects continued to
hold even after controlling for macroeconomic effects, Fama-French risk factors, or
market controls as in Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Mehl (2014).
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This study contributes to two closely related strands of the literature—financial
markets comovements and financial contagion (e.g., King and Wadhwani, 1990;
Morck, Yeung and Yu, 2000; Kodres and Pritsker, 2002; Baele, 2005; Bekaert, Har-
vey and Ng, 2005; Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang, 2009; Mendoza and Quadrini, 2010;
Christoffersen, Errunza, Jacobs and Langlois, 2012; Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher
and Mehl, 2014; Dungey and Gajurel, 2014; Caporin, Pelizzon, Ravazzolo and
Rigobon, 2018). Although Solnik (1974) suggests that international investing adds
substantial diversification benefits, more recent works by Chollete, de la Pen˜a and
Lu (2011), Christoffersen, Errunza, Jacobs and Langlois (2012), Ferna´ndez-Avile´s,
Montero and Orlov (2012), and others note that comovements in financial markets
notably reduce the benefits of diversification. Aloui, Aı¨ssa and Nguyen (2011) state
that “correlations of global stock returns have increased in the recent periods as a
result of increasing financial integration, leading to lower diversification benefits
especially in the longer term” (p. 130), and note that “[a] number of past studies have
reported the existence of significant linkages both between emerging and developed
markets, and among emerging markets” (p. 131, emphases added). At the same time,
recent events tied to the global financial crisis have affected different economies to
differing degrees. These events have particularly affected highly indebted countries
such as Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain (PIIGS) that were at the center
of the Eurozone debt crisis, as compared with more developed economies such as
France, Germany and the UK or the non-EU countries of Switzerland, South Africa,
Japan and the United States.1
To examine these cross-country differences, we start with two core EU and
Eurozone economies—France and Germany—and expand the sample by building
concentric circles outward. We include five EU peripheral countries that adopted
the euro—PIIGS—then expand to the UK, which is part of the EU but does not
use the euro, and Switzerland, a European nation that is neither in the EU nor in
the Eurozone but share languages and is contiguous with both France and Germany.
We further expand our circle geographically to include (1) the United States, a G7
common-law country culturally similar to the UK, (2) South Africa, another common-
law country culturally similar to the UK but smaller and likewise geographically
distant, and (3) Japan, another large G7 country distant from the rest of the sample.
This set of countries differ by EU and euro adoption as well as geographically,
culturally, and by market size.2 We then use multiple statistical methods—from
1 All of the PIIGS economies share an important feature that separates them from countries such as France
or Germany—namely, high debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratios, which manifested in domestic
macroeconomic problems and which became a concern for other European economies. The data that we
analyze support our categorization: stock market indices for Germany, France and the UK are at or above
the Eurozone index (described in detail in Section 3), whereas Italy, Spain and the other PIIGS economies
are distinctly below.
2 Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) and many others examine the link between culture and international stock
market returns.
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simple correlations, which assume a certain returns structure, to more complex and
flexible techniques, such as copulas and quantile dependence—to examine how stock
market comovements vary across these countries before, during, and after the global
financial crisis, and control for a variety of common macroeconomic, market and risk
factors.
Interestingly, we find that while all comovements increase during the global
financial crisis, the comovements increase by about the same amount so that the
relative overall comovement structure remains basically unchanged. This result is
particularly surprising given the different levels from which the comovements started
pre-crisis: the correlation between Greece and Ireland is about 0.36, while between
France and Germany it is about 0.85. Given the differences and the high level at
which the France-Germany correlation is starting, it is surprising that the increase in
the Germany-Spain comovement is the same as the increase in the France-Germany
comovement from before to after the financial crisis. Even more interestingly, these
increases during this time are of about the same magnitude as the increase for the
Greece-Ireland comovement. As we move out of the Eurozone, the comovements
of the UK and the non-EU countries have a similar structure during the crisis and
post-crisis: the magnitude of the UK’s comovement still is between Germany’s and
Switzerland’s comovement. Overall, the structure is relatively similar for all countries
besides Japan.
We also examine the effects of EU membership to see what the experience for the
UK might be on completion of their leaving the EU. To do so, we examine parametric,
nonparametric, and copula-based comovement tests on the Eurozone sample, the UK,
and the four non-EU countries—Japan, South Africa, Switzerland, and the United
States. We observe a lower degree of comovements of the EU members (including the
UK) with South Africa and much lower for both Japan and, surprisingly, the United
States. Switzerland’s comovements with the EU members are stronger but still not
as pronounced as the comovements of the EU’s developed countries with each other.
This finding can be accounted for by Switzerland’s geographical proximity and trade
ties with the EU, as well as similar macroeconomic fundamentals. Therefore, when
the UK completes its exit from the EU, its stock market comovements with the EU
members will likely be weakened.3
We also confirm previous work that found that the interdependence among
the PIIGS equity markets is lower than that between each PIIGS market and either
the most advanced EU nations (i.e., Germany, France, or the UK) or the non-EU
nations. In fact, the advanced EU countries are characterized by more pronounced
comovements with each other than the PIIGS markets with either the advanced EU
3 The UK is subject to the Bank of England’s monetary policy, not the policy of the European Central
Bank (ECB). Thus, the presence of the UK in our sample serves as an independent check of a possible
“euro currency factor” in pricing EU stocks. Since the results for the UK are similar to those for France
and Germany, both in terms of comovements with PIIGS and with other advanced countries, the common
currency alone is not the driving factor behind the results reported in this paper.
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economies or each other. Even during the financial crisis, despite their common high
debt-to-GDP ratios and the common shock to these countries of the global financial
crisis, we find higher interdependence across the advanced EU nations and lower
with the less developed ones.4 These comovements also vary with EU membership.
As an EU but not Eurozone nation, the UK has a high comovement with France and
Germany, lower with Switzerland, and similar comovements with South Africa. The
comovements are even less with either the United States or the PIIGS, and there is
almost no comovement with Japan.5
Finally, we examine the possible effects of variation in common macroeconomic
or market factors on our results. We control for these factors by orthogonalizing the
individual countries’ stock market returns to ECB monetary policy (as reflected
in the ECB marginal lending rate), market interest rates (euro London Inter-bank
Offered Rate [LIBOR] rate), the euro-dollar exchange rate, market uncertainty and
risk (proxied by the volatility index [VIX]), as well as Fama-French, U.S. and global
factors. Our main results continue to hold. Notably, the overall results in this paper
are strongly robust to controlling for monetary policy, market interest rates, exchange
rates, and risk and uncertainty, and are at best only partially affected by the Fama-
French, U.S. and global factors. Thus, in light of the contagion definition in Bekaert,
Harvey and Ng (2005) and the empirical work by Boyson, Stahel and Stulz (2010) and
Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Mehl (2014), among others, our results suggest
that there was a financial contagion in the European equity markets during the global
financial crisis, and that the consequences of this contagion (in the sense of greater
comovements) are felt to this day. Consistent with several recent studies (see, e.g.,
Caporin, Pelizzon, Ravazzolo and Rigobon, 2018; Fratzscher, Lo Duca and Straub,
2018), we find that the U.S. linkages contributed to the spread of contagion in Europe.
Our paper makes several main contributions. First, we employ a wide array
of methodologies that allow us to relate our findings to both the comovement and
contagion literatures. Second, we document in a robust manner several stylized
facts with respect to both cross-sectional and time series structures of comovements.
Cross-sectionally, we find that the comovements among the core EU countries are
4 These results hold even during the latter half of our sample during the market downturn and the global
financial crisis, even though the less developed EU nations were dependent on bailouts at the time.
Although the local effects varied, the global financial crisis had a common theme across Europe due
to excessive leverage. Phylaktis and Xia (2009) point to global and regional shocks as well as financial
linkages in the transmission of the financial crisis. The effects of deleveraging hit the PIIGS more than
the developed markets, and the PIIGS looked to bailouts from the developed markets as they were tied to
them through the euro and so could not just devalue their currency.
5 These results are consistent with the finding of Christoffersen, Errunza, Jacobs and Langlois (2012)
that comovements among emerging markets or between developed and emerging markets are not as
pronounced as those among the developed markets. However, our more recent period also allows for
new observations: while Christoffersen, Errunza, Jacobs and Langlois (2012) study a sample that ends in
June 2009, our sample runs through September 2015, which allows us to compare comovements during
the global financial crisis not only with the pre-crisis period but also with the post-crisis recovery. This
comparison leads us to previously unreported, important results outlined in subsequent paragraphs.
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greater than the comovements between the core and the periphery, and that the core-
periphery comovements, in turn, are more pronounced than the comovements among
the periphery economies. This relative comovement structure is remarkably stable
over time and is not affected by macroeconomic and market factors. We also document
that (1) following the onset of the global financial crisis, the comovement structure
did not increase differentially but rather uniformly, and (2) post-crisis comovements
remained virtually at the same level as they were during the global financial crisis.
Thus, we find that while the recent financial crisis caused a permanent change in the
level of stock market comovements, the relative comovement structure remained the
same and was not affected by the crisis.6
Third, our paper also contributes to the literature as well as to the popular dis-
course by reporting a set of results for the UK that leads us to conclude that the UK’s
stock market comovements with the EU members will likely be weakened once Brexit
is completed. The paper’s additional methodological contribution is in establishing
the robustness of the results using a wide array of methods for assessing stock market
comovements, including linear and nonlinear correlations, copulas, quantile depen-
dence and lower tail dependence, as well as using empirical marginal distributions
and various distributional assumptions of the joint density function. Finally, the paper
has important implications for portfolio management and, in particular, for financial
diversification across the European equity markets.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses
the complementary methodologies used in the paper. Section 3 describes our data,
Section 4 presents the main results, Section 5 investigates if common macroeconomic
and market factors may drive our results, and Section 6 concludes.
2. Methodology
As outlined in Section 1, our research strategy is to select a set of countries that
concentrically expand from the two most developed EU and Eurozone countries and
employ increasingly complex statistical techniques to examine comovements among
these countries over time. We then use these techniques on our sample countries to
answer three main research questions. First, which matters more for the strength of
stock market comovements—being part of the EU or part of the Eurozone? Second,
should we expect tighter comovement among the peripheral Eurozone countries
or between the core and the periphery? Third, did the structure of stock market
6 Our finding of the unchanged relative structure of comovements in the wake of the recent financial crisis
is in line with the results in Forbes and Rigobon (2002) for the earlier crises, which showed that the
conventional correlation coefficients offer a biased measure of comovements since they are conditional
on market volatility, but find only a small increase in unconditional correlation coefficients (referred
to by Forbes and Rigobon as “interdependence”) during the U.S. stock market crash of 1987, the peso
devaluation of 1994, and the Asian crisis of 1997.
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comovements change with the onset of the financial crisis and during the post-crisis
recovery?
Below, we further describe our selection of countries and methodologies.
2.1. Country selection
Our country sample starts with two core Eurozone countries, Germany and
France. To this core, we add five peripheral and highly indebted Eurozone countries
(PIIGS) that have been the focus of attention and that are also part of the EU. Next,
we relax the requirement that the country use the euro and add the UK, a G7 country
that is so far in the EU but not in the Eurozone.
Finally, we remove the requirement for EU membership and add four non-
EU countries: Switzerland, the United States, South Africa, and Japan. These four
non-EU countries were chosen to span similarities to the UK while providing both
similarities and dispersion based on market size and geographical distance from the
core EU/Eurozone countries of France and Germany. As Table 1 indicates, Switzer-
land (market cap $1.1 trillion) is similar in size to France ($1.8 trillion) and Germany
($1.5 trillion), and borders EU countries without using the euro or being part of the
EU.
To provide geographical diversity, we move out of Europe. We first add Japan
($3.7 trillion), which has a market cap similar to the UK but is notably geographically
distant. Next, we span size by including both the United States ($18.7 trillion) and
South Africa ($0.6 trillion). The United States is a large northern hemisphere G7
market that shares a common heritage with the UK and parts of Europe both culturally
and historically but is also geographically distant. South Africa is a smaller southern
hemisphere market that provides some size similarity to the EU peripheral countries
(its market cap is halfway between those of Italy and Spain) while still sharing a
common cultural and historical heritage with the UK and parts of Europe.
Collectively, these countries provide both cross-country similarities and differ-
ences based on distance, size, culture, political affinity, EU membership, and use of
a common currency (the euro).
2.2. Empirical techniques: Correlations, copulas, quantile, and lower tail
dependence
2.2.1. Overview of techniques used
We employ a variety of statistical tests to examine comovements. We start by
studying the more conventional measures of association, including Pearson, Spear-
man’s rho and Kendall’s tau correlations. Next, we turn to copula selection exercises
to find out which copulas fit our data best, fit the selected copulas to the coun-
try returns data, and compute copula correlation coefficients. We rely on empirical
marginal distributions when estimating the various copulas.
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In addition to linear and nonlinear (or rank) correlations and copulas, we as-
sess stock market interdependence using quantile dependence and tail dependence.
Quantile dependence affords the flexibility of varying levels of correlation for dif-
ferent levels of returns. In addition to quantile dependence, tail dependence allows
us to quantify comovements when the stock market returns have extremely high or
extremely low values, and focusing on the lower tail dependence helps us contribute
to the financial contagion literature. All of the dependence measures can be derived
from the estimated copula parameters discussed in the Appendix. Put differently, the
correlations, quantile dependence and tail dependence are different ways of assessing
a dependence structure modeled by a specific copula. Below, we provide more details
on the methodologies used.
2.2.2. Correlations
Similar to most of the existing literature on financial interdependence, we start
our examination using simple correlations. Correlation is by far the most popular
measure of dependence due to its inherent simplicity (e.g., Bekaert, Harvey and Ng,
2005). However, with simplicity come several potentially unattractive features of
correlation. For example, while independence is a sufficient condition for uncorrelat-
edness, the latter does not imply independence. Importantly, the use of correlations
requires the assumption of joint normality.
2.2.3. Nonlinear measures of comovement
Copulas. To overcome some of these issues, researchers recently have turned to
nonlinear measures of comovement such as copula-based dependence measures,
which are not dependent on such assumptions and can examine nonlinear effects.7
Copula methodology uses the information on both the marginal distributions and
their dependence structure contained in any bivariate (or multivariate) distribution
of a random vector, and isolates the description of the dependence structure from
the marginal distributions. Unlike correlations, therefore, a copula approach is not
dependent on distributional assumptions of joint normality that may be violated in
the real world due to the well-documented nonlinearities of financial data (e.g.,
Favero and Giavazzi, 2002). Another attractive attribute of copulas is that they help
disentangle the marginals from the dependence structure, thereby affording a more
precise assessment of market comovements.
7 The use of copulas to measure interdependence is becoming increasingly popular in the literature
on financial market comovements: see, for example, Patton (2006), Bartram, Taylor and Wang (2007),
Rodriguez (2007), Aloui, Aı¨ssa and Nguyen (2011, 2013), Chollete, de la Pen˜a and Lu (2011), Herrera and
Eichler (2011), Christoffersen, Errunza, Jacobs and Langlois (2012) and Reboredo and Ugolini (2015),
among others.
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We fit five copulas (Gaussian Normal, Student’s t , and Archimedean copulas—
Clayton copula, Gumbel copula and Frank copula) to our data on index returns.
Technical preliminaries on copulas and a review of these five copulas are provided in
the Appendix. These five copulas have been used in the comovements literature most
frequently.8 In Section 4, we examine several metrics, statistics, and simulations to
determine which copula(s) fit our data best.
Rank correlations. We use rank correlations to circumvent potential problems as-
sociated with simple correlations, such as their inability to carry much information
about joint distributions or to capture nonlinear interdependence. Rank correlations
are nonparametric measures of dependence or, more precisely, concordance. In par-
ticular, we compute two such measures: Kendall’s tau and Spearman’s rho. One of
the most attractive features of these measures is their dependence on the copula of the
random variables and not on the marginal distributions. Since copulas are immune
to monotonic transformations of random variables, this property allows Kendall’s
tau and Spearman’s rho to capture nonlinear dependence. (See the Appendix for
definitions of Kendall’s tau and Spearman’s rho.)
Quantile dependence. The degree of interdependence when returns are low (e.g.,
during a crisis) can be different from that for average or high returns. To explore
this possibility, we also study quantile dependence, which allows us to observe how
correlation changes from one quantile to the next. Specifically, we follow Patton
(2012) and, for each pair of variables, measure the probability of one variable lying
below (above) its ith quantile, given that the other variable also lies below (above) its
ith quantile. Thus, this measure helps shed light on tail dependence (see, e.g., Patton,
2006) and complements tail dependence coefficients used in the literature (e.g.,
Herrera and Eichler, 2011; Christoffersen, Errunza, Jacobs and Langlois, 2012).9
Tail dependence. In addition, investors and policy makers are particularly con-
cerned with extreme negative comovements, which the empirical literature typically
8 This study focuses on comovements of returns. The existing research that studied volatility have used
some of these copulas in conjunction with GARCH models (e.g., Bartram, Taylor and Wang, 2007;
Aloui, Aı¨ssa and Nguyen 2011, 2013). In this paper, we opt against restricting the power of copulas by
imposing a GARCH model on the data; Aloui, Aı¨ssa and Nguyen (2013) perform a robustness check
using raw returns and report that results are not immune to moving from GARCH-filtered to raw returns.
Christoffersen, Errunza, Jacobs and Langlois (2012) and Lucas, Schwaab and Zhang (2014) use skewed
t copula, which allows for the possibility of an asymmetric dependence. Other variations include the
symmetrized Joe-Clayton (Patton, 2006) and the factor copula (Oh and Patton, 2017).
9 Tail dependence coefficients measure the probability of two variables concurrently assuming extremely
positive or negative values. One could argue that quantile dependence offers a more comprehensive
approach to measuring dependence, as compared with tail dependence, as it explores all realizations of
random variables. Although focusing on extremely negative returns may be sufficient in a pure contagion
context, a comovements study, such as ours, dictates that we include in our analysis the entire range of
returns.
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associates with contagion events (e.g., Rodriguez, 2007; Aloui, Aı¨ssa and Nguyen,
2011). To zero in on the extreme negative comovements, for each pair of stock mar-
kets we report a copula-based lower tail dependence. (Our lower tail dependence
measure is also defined and discussed in the Appendix.)
2.3. Common factors
We also investigate which common macroeconomic and market factors may
have contributed to the observed stock market comovements, both cross-sectionally
and over time. To this end, we orthogonalize the stock market returns using the
following factors: ECB monetary policy, market interest rates, risk and uncertainty (as
proxied by VIX), euro-dollar exchange rate, Fama-French risk factors, and U.S. and
global market factors. We then apply our statistical techniques to the orthogonalized
returns. This approach is in the spirit of Boyson, Stahel and Stulz (2010) and Bekaer,
Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Mehl (2014) and relies on the literature’s most frequently
used definition of contagion from Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005), which views
contagion as an increase in comovements over and above what would be expected
based on the changes in economic fundamentals. Thus, this approach allows us
to place our study not only within the comovements literature but also within the
financial contagion research.
3. Data
We use daily returns since the adoption of the euro (January 1, 1999) on stock
market indices for the five PIIGS economies, three European developed economies
(France, Germany and the UK), as well as the aggregate index for the entire Euro-
zone and four non-EU countries (Switzerland, South Africa, Japan, and the United
States). Our paper analyzes comovements of the nine EU stock market indices and
the four non-EU stock market indices by studying all 78 pairwise correlations as well
as 156 (2 × 78) copula-based dependence measures (as will be seen below, of the five
copulas examined, two fit well). The MSCI indices, which were downloaded from
Datastream, are U.S.-dollar price indices that measure the overall price performance
of the respective markets and do not include dividends.10 A return on each index
10 Datastream mnemonics of the time series used are as follows: MSPORD$ (Portugal), MSITAL$
(Italy), MSEIRE$ (Ireland), MSGDEE$ (Greece), MSSPAN$ (Spain), MSFRNC$ (France), MSGERM$
(Germany), MSUTDK$ (UK), MSEURI$ (Eurozone), MSSWIT$ (Switzerland), MSSARF$ (South
Africa), MSJPAN$ (Japan), MSUSAM$ (the United States). The Eurozone index warrants additional
description. The base date for the index is December 31, 1996. After November 30, 2007, this
index transitioned to the MSCI EMU (European Economic and Monetary Union) Large Cap In-
dex. The index is a free float-adjusted capitalization-weighted index that measures the equity mar-
ket performance of countries within EMU and consists of 10 country indices—Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. For a wealth of ad-
ditional details with regard to construction of MSCI indices (such as index constituents, weights,
etc.), see https://www.msci.com/eqb/methodology/meth_docs/MSCI_Feb2015_GIMIMethodology.pdf
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represents the sum of its constituents’ free float-weighted market capitalization re-
turns. Because of Greece’s reclassification by MSCI, the country’s MSCI time series
ends on November 26, 2013. For consistency and due to the importance of Greece
during the events of the global financial crisis, the main sample studied in the paper
is January 1, 1999 to November 26, 2013. However, as a robustness check, we also
extend the sample to September 24, 2015 (while excluding Greece) and report no
changes in the results.
Although descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 show that the stock returns
for all series are nonnormal, that is not an unusual result for time series of returns on
major markets. There is a difference between the mean and median values for all of
the series (including the very large stock markets of the United States, the UK and
Germany), indicating that the distribution of each of the data series is asymmetrical.
In addition, all of the data series have a high Jarque-Bera value and excess kurtosis
values exceeding the value of 0. However, for most countries including the PIIGS,
the departure from a normal distribution is not considerable.
4. Main results
4.1. Copula selection
To determine which copulas fit our data best, we study several metrics and
statistics as well as conduct simulations. First, we test the significance of the copulas’
parameters on all of our time series, those of both EU and non-EU countries. The
degrees of freedom parameter (ν) for the t copula and the θ parameter for Clayton,
Frank and Gumbel copulas are all significant at the 1% level. Second, we compute
Akaike information criterion and Schwarz Bayesian criterion. According to these
criteria, the t copula produces the best fit, while the fit based on the Archimedean
copulas (Clayton, Frank and Gumbel) is far inferior.11
Third, to further compare t , Clayton, Frank and Gumbel copulas with one
another as well as with the Normal copula, Figure 1 plots empirical copulas based
on the original data against rank-based simulations for each of the five theoretical
copulas under consideration (for the details of this procedure, see Chvosta, Erdman
and Little, 2011). The closer the graph to the 45º line, the better the particular copula
fits our data. Visual inspection of Figure 1 reveals that the t and Normal copulas
provide a better fit than the other three alternatives. Finally, also following Chvosta,
Erdman and Little (2011), we quantify the conclusions drawn from Figure 1 by
comparing percentiles for copulas based on the original data and simulated Clayton,
Frank, Gumbel, Normal and t copulas in Table 2. Specifically, our metric based on
(MSCI Global Investable Market indices Methodology) and https://www.msci.com/eqb/methodology/
meth_docs/MSCI_Apr15_IndexCalcMethodology.pdf (MSCI Index Calculation Methodology). These in-
dices are also available through other data providers such as Bloomberg.
11 Tabulated results are available on request.
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(A) Normal and t copulas
(B) Archimedean copulas (Clayton, Frank, and Gumbel)
Figure 1
Choosing a copula: Empirical copulas based on the original data and simulated Clayton, Frank,
Gumbel, Normal, and t copulas, January 1, 1999 to November 26, 2013
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Table 2
Copula selection: Percentiles for empirical copulas based on the original data and simulated Clayton,
Frank, Gumbel, Normal, and t copulas∑(COt − CSt )2 ≡ sum of squared differences between the empirical copulas based on the original data
and simulations.
Percentile Original data Clayton Frank Gumbel Normal t
0.05 0.01742 0.00664 0.00756 0.01649 0.01511 0.01740
0.10 0.03643 0.01374 0.01717 0.03526 0.03114 0.03641
0.15 0.05500 0.02198 0.02885 0.05404 0.05107 0.05519
0.20 0.07860 0.03114 0.04236 0.07305 0.07259 0.07854
0.25 0.10197 0.04145 0.05908 0.09160 0.09595 0.10190
0.30 0.12970 0.05542 0.08015 0.11404 0.12205 0.12938
0.35 0.15697 0.06938 0.10602 0.13694 0.14747 0.15709
0.40 0.18584 0.08496 0.13144 0.16121 0.17449 0.18571
0.45 0.21677 0.10579 0.16258 0.18617 0.20632 0.21662
0.50 0.25195 0.12892 0.19624 0.21159 0.24319 0.25189
0.55 0.29010 0.15480 0.23540 0.24044 0.28143 0.29013
0.60 0.32493 0.18663 0.27639 0.27273 0.32196 0.32494
0.65 0.36778 0.22578 0.32242 0.30730 0.36593 0.36776
0.70 0.42209 0.27639 0.36936 0.34074 0.41699 0.42203
0.75 0.47709 0.34074 0.42043 0.38264 0.47126 0.47722
0.80 0.54148 0.41539 0.47401 0.43165 0.53538 0.54156
0.85 0.61182 0.52943 0.53355 0.49210 0.60408 0.61163
0.90 0.70005 0.65629 0.59583 0.55370 0.68583 0.70025
0.95 0.79835 0.81841 0.66888 0.64071 0.78956 0.79826
1.00 0.99863 0.99977 0.91482 0.94229 0.99015 0.99863∑(COt − CSt )2 0.18087833 0.07707843 0.10418573 0.00118056 0.00000032
Chvosta, Erdman and Little (2011) is the sum of squared differences between copulas
based on the original data and simulations, which is reported in the last row of Table 2.
In line with the results from Figure 1, we find that the t copula yields the smallest
sum of squared differences (0.00000032) and that the Normal copula produces the
second smallest value (0.00118056). Thus, our copula selection exercises suggest
that the t and Normal copulas fit the data better than the alternatives. Accordingly, in
our subsequent analysis we will confine our attention to these two copulas.12
4.2. Full sample
4.2.1. Linear and nonlinear correlation results
Given that the Gaussian Normal and Student’s t distributions fit our data well,
we begin by using traditional correlation measures of association. Table 3 shows a
12 When we compare the pre-crisis period with crisis and recovery, t and Normal copulas continue to
provide the best fit in both subsamples. Thus, unlike in Okimoto (2008, 2014) and Chollete, Heinen and
Valdesogo (2009), the underlying dependence structure remains unchanged in our sample.
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comparison of three traditional measures of association: Pearson, Spearman’s rho and
Kendall’s tau correlation coefficients over the entire main sample period. The first part
of Table 3 contains the results for the EU—that is, the Eurozone countries and the UK
(as things currently stand)—while the second part of Table 3 repeats the results for the
UK alongside the results for the non-EU countries (as things may become if or when
the UK follows through on its Brexit vote). All values in the table are statistically
significant at the 1% level, except the United States-Japan that are significant at the
5% level. The top value in each cell is the Pearson correlation coefficient, which is the
most widely used measure of association. The Pearson coefficient consistently has
the highest value reported in Table 3. The middle value is the Spearman’s rho, which
is a measure of association by ranks. In our study, the value of Spearman’s rho is
typically 2–5% lower than the respective corresponding value of Pearson correlation.
At the bottom of each cell, we report the values of Kendall’s tau, which is a measure
of concordance. In Table 3, these values are typically 10–15% below the value of the
Pearson correlation coefficients.
The comovements of the non-EU countries’ stock markets with each other and
with the EU members are weaker than the comovements of the EU countries with
each other. In particular, the results for Switzerland (which borders on both France
and Germany and has large trade with both) are particularly informative. The results
for Switzerland, while similar to the UK, are uniformly smaller than the results for the
UK (except for Greece, where they are the same) and for the other EU countries. The
UK-Italy (Pearson correlation of 0.801) and Switzerland-Italy (Pearson correlation
of 0.775) values are particularly indicative, as Switzerland (non-EU) borders Italy
(EU), while the UK (EU) does not. Similar results for non-EU Switzerland and the
bordering countries of France and Greece show that the UK has higher comovements
with EU countries that border Switzerland than does Switzerland. These consistently
weaker comovements suggest that even in the presence of trade interdependence,
stock market comovements of a non-EU country with EU members are weaker than
comovements of EU countries with each other, and may provide a glimpse into what
is likely to happen to the UK stock market comovements with the EU member nations
if and when the UK follows through on its decision to leave the EU.
4.2.2. Copula results
Table 4 reports the copula correlation coefficients based on fitting a t distribution
copula (Panel A) and Gaussian Normal copula (Panel B) to the country return data
over our main time period of January 1, 1999 to November 23, 2013 (when Greece
left the sample). The copula procedure is a measure of dependence by ranks, but
it is also a measure that is dependent on the specification of the underlying data
distribution that is used to transform the data to a [0, 1] uniform distribution. Thus,
although the copula procedure has the advantage of working with nonlinear data
transformations (e.g., returns, log-returns, etc.), the procedure may produce different
values depending on the assumed underlying data distribution. Additionally, only the
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Pearson correlation maintains the time dimension of the different paired data series
being considered. In reviewing the copula correlation values in Panel A of Table 4, we
note that with the exception of Germany, all of the values are approximately midway
between the Pearson and Spearman’s correlation coefficients reported in Table 3. In
the case of Germany, the copula correlations are occasionally 1% above the Pearson
values.
Correlations reported in Panel B of Table 4 rely on a fitted Gaussian Normal
copula. This panel reports values that are only slightly different from our results in
Panel A. Thus, although distributional assumptions of the joint density function make
a difference, this difference is rather small for the data set that we examine. This result
is consistent with our findings in connection with the copula selection exercises—
namely, that the t copula fits the data best, with the Normal copula being a close
second.13 The results for the UK and Switzerland demonstrated in Table 3 continue
to carry over here: The UK (a member of the EU thus far) has higher comovement
copula results with Switzerland’s neighbors than does Switzerland.
Our main results are further reflected in unreported (but available on request)
scatterplots, including a scatterplot based on t copulas and empirical marginal dis-
tributions. We observe that the interdependence among the PIIGS economies is
not as strong as between each of the PIIGS and the more fiscally sound European
economies—Germany, in particular, and the Eurozone, in general. This latter inter-
dependence, in turn, is not as pronounced as the comovements between the core
Eurozone markets.14
4.2.3. Quantile dependence
Another way of examining interdependence between markets is to study quan-
tile dependence. This measure allows for varying levels of correlation under differ-
ent market conditions, such as extremely high or extremely low returns. Figure 2
plots quantile dependence for several pairs of countries. Similar to Patton (2012),
the horizontal axis measures quantiles of returns, and the vertical axis measures
the probability of one return being below (above) its ith quantile, conditional on
the other return also being below (above) its ith quantile. Therefore, the further away
the graph is from a straight line, the more variation in dependence across quantiles
one can observe. Conversely, if a graph is close to a straight line, the correlation is
largely constant across quantiles.15
13 As the Archimedean copulas did not perform well on our goodness-of-fit tests, we do not report their
results here.
14 As a robustness check, we extend the sample to September 24, 2015, to see if our results hold with the
inclusion of the most recent data. Since the MSCI index for Greece is available only through November
26, 2013 (the limiting date for our main sample), we exclude Greece for the purposes of this exercise. Our
results are virtually intact with the expansion of the sample.
15 Thus, this methodology sheds light on tail dependence in the comovements of returns. We use copulas
to examine the possibility of tail dependence in subsection 4.5.
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(A) Quantile dependence: Greece vs. PIIGS
(B) Quantile dependence: Greece vs. advanced EU economies and Eurozone
Figure 2
Quantile dependence: Greece versus PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain; Panel A),
Greece versus advanced European Union (EU) economies and Eurozone (Panel B), and advanced
EU economies and Eurozone versus each other (Panel C), January 1, 1999 to November 26, 2013
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(C) Quantile dependence: Advanced EU economies and Eurozone vs. each other
Figure 2
Continued.
Although quantile dependence graphs in Figure 2 pertaining to advanced Eu-
rozone economies (e.g., Eurozone and France, France and Germany) show little
change in correlation from one quantile to the next, quantile dependence among
PIIGS economies as well as between PIIGS and advanced nations (e.g., Greece
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and Germany, Greece and Italy) reveals a sizeable change in correlation depending
on which quantile is under consideration. In particular, the correlation is smaller
at either high or low ends of the distribution relative to the middle quantiles.
Thus, in the case of the PIIGS economies, we do not observe high extreme de-
pendence between PIIGS and more stable European economies such as Germany,
France and the UK. Our finding of high extreme dependence for the advanced coun-
tries and lower extreme dependence for the peripheral EU countries is similar to
Christoffersen, Errunza, Jacobs and Langlois (2012), who report relatively large tail
dependence for developed markets and relatively low tail dependence for emerging
markets.
Our quantile dependence results also point to the near-symmetry when com-
paring high and low quantiles for each market. This finding is in agreement with
Herrera and Eichler (2011), who use a copula-based nonparametric measure of ex-
treme dependence to investigate the level and possible asymmetries in the extreme
dependence for the European Monetary Union stock markets. Herrera and Eichler
(2011) conclude that the degree of extreme dependence is high and that the depen-
dence structure is largely symmetrical in the post-1999 period (the period studied in
our paper), attributing this symmetry to the high degree of European integration and
globalization.16
4.3. Did comovements increase since the onset of the global financial crisis?
Did the global financial crisis change the correlation structure across the PIIGS
and the developed markets? Arguably, the degree of stock market comovements
can change, especially as an economy transits from a relatively calm economic
environment to a financial crisis. Two forms of changes can occur: first, correlations
across pairs of countries can change, and second, the amount of correlation across
different pairs of countries can change relative to one another.
To investigate the effect of the global financial crisis on the interdependence
matrix across advanced and peripheral Eurozone countries, the UK, and the four
non-EU nations, we split our sample into two periods. The first subsample starts on
January 1, 1999, and runs through to June 30, 2007, and includes mostly tranquil
periods in the stock markets and an expansionary phase of the business cycle. The
second subsample starts with July 1, 2007, which many view as the starting date of
the financial crisis, and runs through November 26, 2013, and thus spans much more
turbulent periods, including the global financial crisis and the subsequent recovery.17
16 Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Mehl (2014), however, do not find strong evidence in support of the
“globalization hypothesis.”
17 July 2007 is sometimes referred to as “watershed” in the context of the events leading up to the collapse
of Bear Stearns and, more broadly, to the global financial crisis (e.g., Maxfield, 2013). All of our results
are robust to using January 2008 as the start of the global financial crisis. In addition, we end on November
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We calculate the three measures of association—Pearson coefficient, Spearman
rho and Kendall’s tau—for the first half and the second half of the sample.18 Similar
to the results for the entire sample, we find that for each of the subsamples Pearson
correlations are generally higher than Spearman’s rho coefficients, which in turn are
higher than Kendall’s taus. We find that for all pairs of countries (except Japan), the
realizations of Pearson, Spearman’s rho and Kendall’s tau correlation coefficients
are higher for the second half of our sample (Table 5), and that these differences
are statistically significant at the 1% level.19 The results in Table 5 suggest that EU
cross-country pairwise correlations increased over 10% (France-Germany) to 16%
(UK-Germany) for developed nations and between 15% (Ireland-Greece) and 30%
(Portugal-Italy) for the PIIGS countries. Notably, Portugal’s correlations increased
across the board. Besides Portugal’s cross-correlations, the general increase is about
12% (Italy-Spain) to 23% (Greece-Italy) and the increases are similar in magnitude
between the PIIGS to advanced economies before and after the global financial crisis.
In general, the increases were relatively similar.
Also of interest are the UK’s changes relative to the Eurozone and the non-EU
countries. For the most part, the changes across the periods for the UK mirror those
of the Eurozone nations as shown in the first half of Table 5. The changes across the
two periods for the UK and the non-EU countries shown in the second half of Table 5
also are interesting. Again, the increases in comovement among the UK and other
countries tend to be similar to those for Switzerland, and the increases in comovement
are larger for the UK than for Switzerland (for France and the Eurozone, the Pearson
coefficient is smaller, but the Spearman’s rho and Kendall’s taus are both larger).
Given that the UK’s comovements with France and Germany were already higher
than Switzerland’s in the first half, the larger increase in comovements is particularly
indicative as there was less room to rise.
Overall, the results are indicative of the more pronounced comovements during
the global financial crisis. This is consistent with Longin and Solnik (2001), who
report higher comovements in bear markets among MSCI equity indices for a sample
ending in 1996. The increased comovements that we observe in our sample are
also in line with an upward trend in return correlations for the European stock
markets reported by Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang (2009). The values of our three
26, 2013, to include Greece. All of the results are consistent if we exclude Greece and extend the sample
through September 2015.
18 The resulting tables are not reported here to conserve space but are available from the authors on request.
19 To determine whether any two correlations are significantly different from each another, we implement
a test of equivalence of correlation coefficients, H0 : r1 = r2. If Fisher’s z-transform (see, e.g., Papoulis,
1990) is applied to both correlations: zi = 12 ln( 1+ri1−ri ), i = 1, 2, then
z1−z2√
1
N1−3 +
1
N2−3
a∼ N (0, 1), where N1
and N2 are sample sizes. For example, given our subsamples (N1 = 2, 215 and N2 = 1, 672), a change in
correlation from 0.5 to 0.56 would be significant at 1%. Also significant at 1% would be a change from
0.9 to 0.915.
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measures of association are lower for the first half of the sample relative to the
overall sample (and relative to the second half). This result can be accounted for
by the much lower volatility—and therefore covolatility—of returns prior to 2007.
So, it is true that interdependence increased after the global financial crisis. This
result supports the findings of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Rodriguez (2007) of
increased interdependence during earlier crises, such as the Mexican crisis of 1994
and the Asian crisis of 1997.
This increase after the global financial crisis is not the end of the story, however.
We observe that while all linear and nonlinear measures of dependence are higher
during the second half of the sample, the same pattern of relationship holds in each
subsample as in the entire sample. Namely, pairwise correlations are lowest on average
across PIIGS with each other, correlations between the PIIGS and the developed
EU nations (France, Germany, and the UK) are higher, and correlations among the
developed countries are the highest. For example, focusing on the Spearman’s rho
correlation coefficients, in the first half of the sample, the average of correlations
among PIIGS was 0.47, the average of correlations between PIIGS and developed
EU economies was 0.57, and the average of correlations among the developed EU
countries was 0.76. In the second half of the sample, the average correlations were
0.66 among PIIGS, 0.75 for PIIGS versus developed EU economies, and 0.90 for the
developed EU nations.20
Thus, while there was an increase in comovement from the pre-crisis to crisis
periods, our main results with regard to the ordering of correlations hold in both
tranquil and turbulent periods. So, while we find that correlations increased, the
relative correlation structure across these markets did not change with the onset
of the global financial crisis. This is consistent with the Eurozone countries being
sensitive to a common economic factor, whose importance increased with the onset
of the recent financial crisis. For example, European financial markets may now be
more dependent on the forward guidance and interest rate policies adopted by the
ECB and the Bank of England. As emphasized in Stubbington, Zeng and Wei (2015,
para. 4), “[t]he bouts of turmoil highlight markets’ growing reliance on the words and
actions of central banks in the years following the financial crisis.” Our results for
the four non-EU countries (Switzerland, the United States, Japan, and South Africa)
support this conclusion and highlight the similarities between Switzerland and the
UK, while still indicating higher comovements for the UK with the other EU nations.
Figure 3 further illustrates this point by plotting the changes in Pearson correla-
tions between pre- and post-2007 periods for several pairs of countries. We observe
20 Although generally consistent across countries, Table 5 does note some interesting differences. The
correlations for Ireland, Greece, and Portugal generally increased by about 0.2 to 0.3 from the pre-crisis
period to the crisis period, while Spain, Italy, France, the UK and Germany tended to increase between
0.1 and 0.2. Part of the limitation of the increase might be structural. In the former period, correlations for
France, Germany and the UK were already above 0.7; in the latter period, the correlations among these
countries were around 0.9. (The theoretical limit of 1.0 for correlations curbed notable further increases.)
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Figure 3
Changes in correlations between the first half of the sample (January 1, 1999 to June 30, 2007) and
the second half of the sample (July 1, 2007 to November 26, 2013)
that the correlations have increased but that this increase is generally uniform (with
the exception of the phenomenon outlined in footnote 20). Although international
equity markets are expected to be more correlated during bear markets (e.g., Ang and
Bekaert, 2002), our findings that, for example, the France-Germany comovements
are greater than the Greece-Ireland comovements during the crisis (in addition to
the tranquil period) are both surprising and interesting. They suggest that during
turbulent times, the advanced economies should be more concerned about market
volatility in other advanced nations than in the economies that are historically more
prone to financial instability such as PIIGS.
These findings are confirmed when we compare scatterplot matrices for the
two subsamples.21 Correspondence between any pair of countries’ returns is closer
(as evidenced by a tighter fit around the 45º line)—and, therefore, comovements
are more pronounced—for the second half of the sample that includes the global
financial crisis. Thus, the values of the measures of associations are higher during
the subsample that includes the financial crisis. This is in line with much of the
literature that suggests that comovements must be more pronounced during crises
(e.g., Bekaert, Harvey and Ng, 2005). Even so, the relative ordering holds. Even
during the crisis period, the advanced EU markets were more interdependent with
each other than the PIIGS were with each other, or even than the PIIGS were with
21 Due to space considerations, the figures are not reported but are available on request.
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the advanced EU markets, and the UK comoved more with the EU than does non-EU
Switzerland.
Our results pertaining to the comparison of market comovements in pre-crisis
and turbulent periods can also be construed as an indirect empirical test of Kodres and
Pritsker’s (2002) theoretical study.22 Our results are largely consistent with the broad
implications of the model (e.g., that a financial contagion can occur among countries
that do not share the same macroeconomic fundamentals). However, we also report
empirical findings that may differ from possible implications in Kodres and Pritsker
(2002): for example, our finding that all comovements increased by about the same
amount does not in this case necessarily imply that less advanced economies are
more vulnerable to contagion, or that lower information asymmetry is guaranteed to
reduce a country’s vulnerability to contagion.23
4.4. Did the comovements change between crisis and recovery?
One may wonder if the results reported above may be an artifact of combining
the crisis and recovery periods into one subsample. Here, we further refine our results
by studying the global financial crisis and recovery periods separately and comparing
market comovements between the two periods and with the pre-crisis period. To
this end, we define the global financial crisis as starting in July 2007 (consistent
with our previous analysis) and ending in June 2009. One way in which our study of
comovements relates to the literature on contagion is that the period of financial crisis
is institutionally determined, as most agree that the recent crisis started in mid 2007
and ended (approximately) by mid 2009.24 These dates are consistent with the data
on the main macroeconomic and financial indicators such as GDP and stock market
indices. For example, Italy had negative GDP growth in 2007:Q3 and 2007:Q4,
while the big European economies began to shrink in 2008:Q2. The euro area shows
positive GDP growth starting with 2009:Q3.25 Further, the literature defines a stock
market crisis as a sharp fall in the stock market index (Pericoli and Sbracia, 2003).
According to this definition, the stock market crisis in Europe ended by mid 2009.
Thus, the macroeconomic indicators suggest that the financial crisis in Europe (which
22 Three specific channels of contagion can be studied in the context of Kodres and Pritsker’s (2002)
model: correlated information (e.g., King and Wadhwani, 1990), correlated liquidity shock (e.g., Yuan,
2005), and cross-market rebalancing (e.g., Kodres and Pritsker, 2002).
23 Kodres and Pritsker (2002) argue that relatively less developed countries are characterized by relatively
higher information asymmetries; however, we do not find, for example, that Greece is more susceptible to
contagion than Germany.
24 Such an approach of using institutional information to establish the cut-off dates of a crisis helps alleviate
endogeneity concerns. The next subsection conducts a robustness check by identifying crisis events using
a measure of extreme negative comovements.
25 See the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) statistics, http://stats.oecd.
org/Index.aspx?QueryName=350&QueryType=View&Lang=en
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Table 6
Comovements among PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain), advanced European Union
(EU), and non-EU countries during pre-crisis (January 1, 1999 to June 30, 2007), crisis (July 1, 2007
to June 30, 2009), and recovery (July 1, 2009 to November 26, 2013) periods: Average of Pearson
correlation coefficients
The last two columns of the table show the difference between the crisis and pre-crisis periods and the
difference between the recovery and crisis periods. The significance tests are t-tests for the difference in
means, except for UK-Switzerland, which is done in both cases using Fisher’s z-transform-based test as
in Table 5.
Groups of countries Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Crisis minus
pre-crisis
Post-crisis
minus crisis
PIIGS with PIIGS 0.472 0.689 0.645 0.217*** −0.044
Advanced EU with
PIIGS
0.587 0.791 0.748 0.204*** −0.043
Advanced EU with
advanced EU
0.824 0.928 0.922 0.104** −0.006
Non-EU with PIIGS 0.343 0.547 0.486 0.204*** −0.061
Non-EU with
advanced EU
0.454 0.610 0.607 0.156* −0.003
Non-EU with non-EU 0.254 0.359 0.378 0.105 0.019
UK with Switzerland 0.706 0.860 0.832 0.154*** −0.028*
***
,
**
,
* indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.
is not necessarily synonymous with the European debt crisis) was over by the end of
2009.26
Table 6 and Figure 4 summarize our main findings by reporting comovements
among PIIGS, between PIIGS and advanced EU countries, and among advanced EU
economies, as measured by average Pearson correlations, for all relevant pairs of
countries, as well as the non-EU countries with these groups and with themselves
(non-EU with non-EU).27 As the UK and Switzerland are of particular interest, we
also separate out the UK’s comovement with Switzerland. In line with our previous
results, we find that comovements within and across the groups of countries were
higher following the onset of the global financial crisis and interestingly were of ap-
proximately the same magnitude for comparable groups. For example, comovements
of advanced EU countries with PIIGS increased by 0.204 from the pre-crisis to the
crisis period, as did the comovements of non-EU countries with PIIGS; the increase
26 To check if our results are robust to alternative cut-off dates for the global financial crisis, we use
January 2008 to December 2009 as the alternative definition of the crisis and compare the two sets of
results for the three comovement metrics (Pearson correlation, Spearman’s rho and Kendall’s tau) for the
four subsamples—pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis combined, crisis, and recovery. The greatest relative
difference across all metrics and all subsamples is 8.2%, with the majority of differences being less than
2%. Thus, all of the results reported in this paper are robust to using 2008–2009 as the crisis period.
27 The results for Spearman’s rho and Kendall’s tau coefficients are similar.
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Figure 4
Comovements among PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain), between PIIGS and ad-
vanced economies, and among advanced economies during pre-crisis (January 1, 1999 to June 30,
2007), crisis (July 1, 2007 to June 30, 2009), and recovery (July 1, 2009 to November 26, 2013)
periods: Average correlations
for advanced EU with each other was 0.104, and the increase for the non-EU with
each other was almost the same at 0.105. Additionally, the comovements among the
more advanced countries were higher than among PIIGS and higher than between
PIIGS and advanced countries in all three periods—before, during, and after the
global financial crisis. The increases in comovements from pre-crisis to crisis periods
were all significant (with the exception of comovements of non-EU countries with
each other).
Most striking in this new set of results is the finding that the level of comovements
barely changed between the crisis and recovery periods. For instance, the first row
of Table 6 shows that the average correlation among the PIIGS countries was 0.47
prior to the global financial crisis, went up notably to 0.69 during the recession, and
then barely decreased to 0.65 during the recovery phase. The evolution of the average
correlation between PIIGS and advanced economies was similar in relative terms,
albeit at a higher level: 0.59 during the pre-crisis period, 0.79 during the crisis, and
0.75 after the global financial crisis. The average correlation among the advanced
economies was higher than among PIIGS or between PIIGS and advanced nations
during all periods: it went up from 0.82 to 0.93 with the onset of the global financial
crisis and stayed nearly constant (went down by only 0.006) as Europe began to
recover. Similar results were found for the non-EU countries. As evident from the
last column of Table 6, all differences in the average correlations between crisis and
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post-crisis periods are economically de minimis and in fact increased among the
non-EU countries by a small amount. Even the non-EU comovements with the
advanced EU countries increased by about 0.16 during the crisis and were mitigated
by only a negligible amount (−0.003) post-crisis. The comovements during the
recovery are statistically indistinguishable from those during the crisis.
Thus, our results show that not only did the relative comovement structure
remain the same across our entire post-1999 sample but also the actual (absolute)
structure was virtually constant between the crisis and post-crisis periods. This is
an important result, as it indicates that the level of stock market comovements was
permanently affected by the global financial crisis.
4.5. Extreme comovements
Thus far, we examined the entire range of returns observed in our sample starting
with the introduction of the euro, as well as in three subsamples including the crisis
period. The empirical literature frequently associates financial crisis with extreme
negative comovements (e.g., Rodriguez, 2007). To check how our results based on
the institutional definition of a crisis compare with what one may observe using this
alternative definition, we compute copula-based lower tail dependence coefficients
for each of the 36 pairs of EU stock markets (including the UK). As outlined in
Section 2, this measure of extreme negative comovements is defined as the limit
of conditional probability that the realization of one country’s return is less than
a certain percentile, given that another country’s return is also less than the same
percentile (upper tail dependence is defined similarly). In other words, we now
explore comovements between each pair of stock markets when market returns take
on extreme negative values.28
Table 7 presents the coefficients of lower and upper tail dependence at the
5% quantile (i.e., bottom 5% and top 5%). The results corroborate our findings
reported in the preceding subsections. In particular, the average of extreme negative
comovements is 0.459 among the PIIGS, 0.532 between the PIIGS and the advanced
EU countries, and 0.689 among the advanced EU nations. The results for the 1% cutoff
are similar.29 Thus, our previous findings—namely, that the comovements among the
advanced markets are greater than between the PIIGS and the advanced nations,
which in turn are greater than the comovements among the PIIGS—hold even if we
28 Asymptotic dependence requires large samples to be estimated accurately, and we believe that our time
series dimension with 3,887 daily observations is sufficient in this regard. Another potential issue may
stem from the bias-efficiency tradeoff in estimating asymptotic dependence: having a larger sample for
the tail quantile will yield more efficient tail estimates but may lead to a bias (e.g., Poon, Rockinger and
Tawn, 2004; de Haan and Ferreira, 2006, Chapter 3). Our quantile dependence results (Fig. 2) point to the
stability of the point estimates for various quantiles, which suggests that our relatively large sample size
does not lead to a significant bias.
29 The results for the 1% lower and upper tails are not reported here but are available on request.
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define crisis by way of extreme negative comovements. The upper tail dependence
coefficients are slightly different from the lower tail dependence numbers, which
points to the mild tail asymmetry and suggests that advanced nations show stronger
comovements with one another than with the peripheral EU economies during bullish
markets as well, consistent with Herrera and Eichler (2011).
5. Can macroeconomic or market factors account for the
comovements?
We now turn to the effects on the pattern of comovements of variation in macroe-
conomic and market factors, such as ECB monetary policy, market interest rates, risk
and uncertainty (as proxied by VIX), euro-dollar exchange rate, as well as Fama-
French risk factors and U.S. and global market factors. Controlling for these various
factors connects our results to both the financial contagion literature and the financial
comovements research. Our methodology in this section is similar to Boyson, Stahel
and Stulz (2010) and Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Mehl (2014), and follows
closely the literature’s consensus definition of contagion in Bekaert, Harvey and Ng
(2005)—namely, that contagion is an increase in comovements relative to what would
have been expected based on the changes in the economic fundamentals.
5.1. Monetary policy
We begin our robustness analysis by exploring the possibility that the comove-
ments before, during, and after the financial crisis may have been driven by the
changes in the ECB’s monetary policy. To control for the monetary policy, we or-
thogonalize each country’s stock market returns by the ECB marginal rate and then
use the residuals from the following regressions: Ri,t = β0 + β1 · ECBratet + t ,
where Ri,t is country i’s stock market return and ECBratet is the ECB marginal lend-
ing rate, to calculate the parametric and nonparametric measures of dependence (i.e.,
Pearson, Spearman’s rho and Kendall’s tau coefficients). The resulting cross-country
correlations (not reported here for brevity but available on request) are virtually iden-
tical to the ones reported for the raw data in Table 3. In particular, the change in
all three measures of dependence for all but one pair of countries is less than 1%.
The only exception is the United States-Japan correlations, which changed by about
5%.
These results carry over to the average comovements among and within the
three groups of countries—PIIGS, advanced EU and non-EU. Table 8 reports the
comovements, as measured by average Pearson correlations, before, during, and after
the global financial crisis; the results for Spearman’s rho and Kendall’s tau coefficients
are similar. The last two columns show the difference between the crisis and pre-crisis
periods and the difference between the recovery and crisis periods. The significance
tests are t-tests for the difference in means, except for UK-Switzerland, which is
done using Fisher’s z-transform-based test as in Table 5. A comparison of Table 8
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Table 8
Controlling for the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary policy (ECB marginal lending rate):
Comovements among PIIGS, advanced European Union (EU) and non-EU countries during pre-
crisis (January 1, 1999 to June 30, 2007), crisis (July 1, 2007 to June 30, 2009), and recovery (July 1,
2009 to November 26, 2013) periods: Average correlations
This table explores the possibility that the European monetary policy may explain the observed pattern of
comovements. To control for the monetary policy, each country’s stock market returns are orthogonalized
by the ECB’s marginal lending rate. The table reports group averages of cross-country correlations of the
residuals from the following regressions: Ri,t = β0 + β1 · ECBratet + t , where Ri,t is country i’s stock
market return and ECBratet is the ECB marginal lending rate. The last two columns show the difference
between the crisis and pre-crisis periods and the difference between the recovery and crisis periods. The
significance tests are t-tests for the difference in means, except for UK-Switzerland, which is done in both
cases using Fisher’s z-transform-based test as in Table 5.
Groups of countries Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Crisis minus
pre-crisis
Post-crisis
minus crisis
PIIGS with PIIGS 0.478 0.749 0.673 0.270*** −0.075
Advanced EU with
PIIGS
0.597 0.825 0.775 0.228*** −0.050
Advanced EU with
Advanced EU
0.841 0.942 0.938 0.101** −0.004
Non-EU with PIIGS 0.342 0.546 0.485 0.205*** −0.061
Non-EU with
Advanced EU
0.453 0.610 0.606 0.157* −0.003
Non-EU with non-EU 0.253 0.358 0.378 0.105 0.020
UK with Switzerland 0.706 0.860 0.832 0.154*** −0.027*
***
,
**
,
* indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.
with Table 6 reveals that the structure of comovements across pre-crisis, crisis, and
post-crisis periods is immune to controlling for the ECB policy: namely, that the
comovements increased significantly during the global financial crisis and remained
at this higher level during the post-crisis period. In fact, each of the summary averages
by group pairs change by less than 1% relative to the group averages reported for
the raw returns in Table 6. Also intact are the cross-sectional differences: for all
subperiods, the comovements among advanced EU countries are more pronounced
than the comovements of advanced EU economies with PIIGS, which in turn are
greater than the comovements within the PIIGS group. We conclude, therefore, that
the ECB policy is not the common factor that can explain the structure of stock market
comovements.
5.2. Market factors
Next, we examine whether the observed structure of comovements, either among
the various groups of countries or across time, is influenced by other macroeconomic
and market factors. To this end, we control for the following factors available at daily
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frequency: euro LIBOR three-month rate, Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE)
VIX, and the euro-dollar exchange rate.30 Table 9 reports cross-country correlations of
the residuals from the following regressions: Ri,t = β0 + β1 · LIBORt + β2 · VIXt +
β3 · ExchRatet + t , where Ri,t is country i’s stock market return, LIBORt is the
euro LIBOR three-month rate, VIXt is the CBOE VIX, and ExchRatet is the euro-
dollar exchange rate. In each cell, the first number is Pearson correlation coefficient,
the second number is Spearman’s rho, and the third number is Kendall’s tau. All
coefficients are significant at the 1% level except for the United States-Japan pair.
As expected, most of the correlation coefficients are reduced as a result of
orthogonalizing the stock market returns by these three factors. Even so, all of the
measures of dependence for all pairs of countries (with the exception of the United
States-Japan pair) changed by no more than 5%, as compared with the raw return
correlations (Table 3). This relative similarity suggests that the comovements structure
across time and across groups of countries should be largely preserved in the face of
controlling for the LIBOR rate, VIX and the exchange rate. Table 10 confirms this by
showing the average orthogonalized comovements among PIIGS, advanced EU and
non-EU economies before, during, and after the financial crisis. As compared with
the correlations in raw returns (Table 6), controlling for the market factors reduces
each of the group averages by only 3% or less. Similar to the raw returns results, we
find that the comovements for all combinations of groups of countries (except for
non-EU countries with each other) increase significantly during the global financial
crisis and that there was no significant reduction in level of these comovements after
the crisis had ended.
5.3. Fama-French factors
We next control for Fama-French risk factors that could be driving the results.
Accordingly, we orthogonalize each country’s stock market returns using the daily
Fama-French equity market factors.31 We compute cross-country correlations of the
residuals from the Fama-French three-factor model with market portfolio return,
market capitalization (SMB [small minus big]) and book-to-market (HML [high
minus low]) factors.32 The results, which are omitted due to space considerations
but are available on request, show that with the exception of U.S. comovements with
30 Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Mehl (2014), for example, use VIX as a proxy for risk aversion and
emphasize the importance of considering the interest rate and exchange rate exposures.
31 The daily factors are available from Kenneth French’s Web site (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.
edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html).
32 Although substantial progress has been made by other countries, the United States is widely believed to
be the world financial leader, particularly before, during, and after the crisis period. For consistency, we
use daily U.S. Fama-French factors.
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Table 10
Controlling for market actors (euro LIBOR three-month rate, volatility index [VIX], and euro-dollar
exchange rate): Comovements among PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain), advanced
European Union (EU), and non-EU countries during pre-crisis (January 1, 1999 to June 30, 2007),
crisis (July 1, 2007 to June 30, 2009), and recovery (July 1, 2009 to November 26, 2013) periods:
Average correlations
This table examines whether macroeconomic and market factors, including the euro LIBOR three-month
rate, VIX, and the euro-dollar exchange rate, may explain the observed pattern of comovements. Bekaert,
Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Mehl (2014), for example, use VIX as a proxy for risk aversion and emphasizes
the importance of entertaining the interest rate and exchange rate exposures. Accordingly, each country’s
stock market returns are orthogonalized by these market factors. The table reports group averages of
cross-country correlations of the residuals from the following regressions: Ri,t = β0 + β1 · LIBORt +
β2 · VIXt + β3 · ExchRatet + t , where Ri,t is country i’s stock market return, LIBORt is the euro LIBOR
three-month rate, VIXt is the CBOE VIX, and ExchRatet is the euro-dollar exchange rate. The last
two columns show the difference between the crisis and pre-crisis periods and the difference between
the recovery and crisis periods. The significance tests are t-tests for the difference in means, except for
UK-Switzerland, which is done in both cases using Fisher’s z-transform-based test as in Table 5.
Groups of countries Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Crisis minus
pre-crisis
Post-crisis
minus crisis
PIIGS with PIIGS 0.474 0.745 0.670 0.271*** −0.075
Advanced EU with
PIIGS
0.593 0.822 0.772 0.230*** −0.050
Advanced EU with
advanced EU
0.839 0.941 0.937 0.102** −0.003
Non-EU with PIIGS 0.335 0.541 0.480 0.206*** −0.061
Non-EU with
advanced EU
0.447 0.605 0.602 0.158* −0.003
Non-EU with non-EU 0.246 0.351 0.371 0.105 0.020
UK with Switzerland 0.703 0.858 0.830 0.154*** −0.028*
***
,
**
,
* indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.
other markets, the comovements in orthogonalized returns are lower by 15% or less
relative to the comovements in raw returns.33
Interestingly, Table 11 shows that the relative structure of average comovements
across time remained largely intact, albeit at a lower level. In particular, the comove-
ments within and across the groups of countries within the EU went up with the
advent of the financial crisis and went down only slightly, and insignificantly, during
the recovery period.34 Thus, both cross-section and time series results with respect to
33 Not surprisingly, since this exercise controls for the U.S. Fama-French factors, the changes in correlations
of the United States with other countries changed much more drastically; the factor regression for the
United States produces an R2 of 0.99.
34 The results for non-EU countries are driven by the drastic changes in the U.S. correlations with other
countries and show no significant changes throughout.
M. A. Goldstein et al./The Financial Review 54 (2019) 5–56 43
Table 11
Controlling for Fama-French daily factors: Comovements among PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy,
Greece and Spain), advanced European Union (EU), and non-EU countries during pre-crisis (Jan-
uary 1, 1999 to June 30, 2007), crisis (July 1, 2007 to June 30, 2009), and recovery (July 1, 2009 to
November 26, 2013) periods: Average of correlations
This table explores the possibility that the Fama-French three factors may drive the ob-
served pattern of comovements. Each country’s stock market returns are orthogonalized using
the daily Fama-French factors from Kenneth French’s Web site (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/
pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). The table reports group averages of cross-country correla-
tions of the residuals from the Fama-French three-factor model with market portfolio return, market
capitalization (SMB [small minus big]), and book-to-market (HML [high minus low]) factors. The last
two columns show the difference between the crisis and pre-crisis periods and the difference between
the recovery and crisis periods. The significance tests are t-tests for the difference in means, except for
UK-Switzerland, which is done in both cases using Fisher’s z-transform-based test as in Table 5.
Groups of countries Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Crisis minus
pre-crisis
Post-crisis
minus crisis
PIIGS with PIIGS 0.460 0.702 0.594 0.242*** −0.109
Advanced EU with
PIIGS
0.567 0.788 0.701 0.221*** −0.087*
Advanced EU with
advanced EU
0.796 0.914 0.892 0.118** −0.022
Non-EU with PIIGS 0.252 0.410 0.305 0.159* −0.105
Non-EU with
advanced EU
0.300 0.446 0.414 0.146 −0.032
Non-EU with non-EU 0.123 0.177 0.201 0.054 0.024
UK with Switzerland 0.653 0.814 0.734 0.162*** −0.080***
***
,
**
,
* indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.
the market comovements in Europe hold when controlling for the Fama-French risk
factors.
5.4. U.S. and global factors
Finally, we explore the possibility that U.S. and global factors may explain the
observed pattern of comovements. Following Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Mehl
(2014), each country’s stock market returns are orthogonalized using a U.S.-specific
factor, measured by the U.S. MSCI index, and a global factor, measured by the world
MSCI index, where, as in Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Mehl (2014), the global
factor is the residuals from regressing the world index returns on the U.S. index
returns. Note that this is an extremely liberal test, as we are controlling for the market
index of the United States, a world financial leader, as well as the world market index,
which reflects movements of individual countries’ indices. Therefore, if we find any
positive correlations and any semblance of the cross-sectional or time series structure
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that we reported for the raw returns, it would be strong evidence in support of our
findings.
Table 12 reports cross-country correlations of the residuals from a modified
world capital-asset pricing model as in Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Mehl
(2014) with U.S. and global factors as described above.35 Table 12 correlates the
residuals from the following regressions: Ri,t = β0 + β1 · RUS,t + β2 · RGlobal,t + t ,
where Ri,t is country i’s stock market return, RUS,t is the U.S. factor (i.e., the
return on the U.S. MSCI index), and RGlobal,t is the (orthogonalized) global fac-
tor (i.e., the return on the world MSCI index). In each cell, the first number is
Pearson correlation coefficient, the second number is Spearman’s rho, and the
third number is Kendall’s tau. Most coefficients are significant at the 1% level,
and most correlations remain positive, with United States and Japan being notable
exceptions.
Table 13 shows average Pearson correlations within and between the three
groups of countries—PIIGS, advanced EU and non-EU—for the three subperiods—
pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis. As before, the last two columns show the difference
between the crisis and pre-crisis periods, as well as the difference between the
recovery and crisis periods. Although the statistical significance of the differences
between crisis and post-crisis correlations disappears as a result of controlling for
the U.S. and global factors, the relative structure of correlations and their economic
significance is preserved. We find that for all six pair combinations of our three
groups of countries (i.e., PIIGS with each other, advanced EU with PIIGS, advanced
EU with each other, non-EU with PIIGS, non-EU with advanced EU, and non-EU
with each other), the comovements increased during the crisis. Strikingly, for four
of the six pairs, the (orthogonalized) comovements continued to increase during the
post-crisis recovery, albeit only slightly and statistically insignificantly. Thus, even
when we control for U.S. and global factors, thereby severely reducing the likelihood
of the robustness of the main results, we still detect the comovements structure that
we found in the raw returns data.
5.5. Summary of robustness results
Our robustness exercises above suggest that the cross-country comovements
reported in Section 4 can be explained only partially, at best, by some of the macroe-
conomic and market factors. Importantly, the relative structure of the comovements,
both cross-sectionally and across time, remains largely immune to including the var-
ious control variables. Several specific results emerged from our analysis. First, the
comovements among the Eurozone, EU and non-EU markets in our data are found
to be unrelated to the monetary policy conducted by the ECB. Second, such market
35 The domestic factor in Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Mehl (2014)—country MSCI index—is our
dependent variable.
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Table 13
Controlling for the U.S. and global factors: Comovements among PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy,
Greece and Spain), advanced European Union (EU), and non-EU countries during pre-crisis
(January 1, 1999 to June 30, 2007), crisis (July 1, 2007 to June 30, 2009), and recovery (July 1,
2009 to November 26, 2013) periods: Average correlations
This table explores the possibility that U.S. and global factors may explain the observed pattern of
comovements. Following Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Mehl (2014), each country’s stock market
returns are orthogonalized using a U.S.-specific factor, measured by the U.S. MSCI index, and a global
factor, measured by the world MSCI index, where, as in Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Mehl (2014),
the global factor is the residuals from regressing the world index returns on the U.S. index returns. The
table reports group averages of cross-country correlations of the residuals from a modified world capital-
asset pricing model as in Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Mehl (2014) with U.S. and global factors as
described above. Note that the domestic factor in Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Mehl (2014)—the
country MSCI index—is our dependent variable. Thus, we correlate the residuals from the following
regressions: Ri,t = β0 + β1 · RUS,t + β2 · RGlobal,t + t , where Ri,t is country i’s stock market return,
RUS,t is the U.S. factor (i.e., the return on the U.S. MSCI index), and RGlobal,t is the (orthogonalized)
global factor (i.e., the return on the world MSCI index). The last two columns show the difference between
the crisis and pre-crisis periods and the difference between the recovery and crisis periods. The significance
tests are t-tests for the difference in means, except for UK-Switzerland, which is done in both cases using
Fisher’s z-transform-based test as in Table 5.
Groups of countries Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Crisis minus
pre-crisis
Post-crisis
minus crisis
PIIGS with PIIGS 0.209 0.262 0.341 0.053 0.078
Advanced EU with
PIIGS
0.203 0.336 0.369 0.133* 0.033
Advanced EU with
advanced EU
0.434 0.571 0.548 0.137 −0.023
Non-EU with PIIGS −0.062 −0.007 −0.004 0.055 0.003
Non-EU with
advanced EU
−0.124 −0.071 −0.038 0.052 0.033
Non-EU with non-EU −0.074 −0.101 −0.104 −0.027 −0.003
UK with Switzerland 0.201 0.255 0.078 0.054 −0.177***
***
,
* indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.10 level, respectively.
factors as the LIBOR rate, VIX and exchange rate cannot account for the observed
comovements. Third, our main results are robust to controlling for the Fama-French
risk factors. Finally, although the results are weakened when U.S. and global factors
are introduced as controls, we still find the same relative pattern of comovements
both cross-sectionally (i.e., for the various groups of countries) and over time (i.e., for
pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods). Taken together—and in light of Bekaert,
Harvey and Ng’s (2005) definition of contagion—our results suggest that there has
been a financial contagion in Europe during the financial crisis and that the specific
mechanisms behind the spread of the contagion are in line with those studied by Ca-
porin, Pelizzon, Ravazzolo and Rigobon (2018) and Fratzscher, Lo Duca and Straub
(2018)—namely, that the spread of the contagion can be partially accounted for by
the linkages between European and U.S. markets. Notably, we find that the increased
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comovements are not yet a thing of the past, even when controlling for monetary
policy, interest rates, exchange rates, market uncertainty, and Fama-French, U.S. and
global factors. Thus, our main results with respect to the comovements structure hold
across the board.
6. Conclusions
Using parametric, semi-parametric and nonparametric techniques, we find that
stock market interdependence increased among Eurozone countries, the UK, and four
non-EU countries during the global financial crisis but has not notably attenuated af-
terward. We examine traditional and nonlinear correlations, Student’s t and Gaussian
copulas, as well as lower tail dependence and quantile dependence using MSCI stock
indices data for the EU countries of France, Germany, the UK and the PIIGS, as well
as four non-EU countries, focusing on the post-euro adoption period (January 1999
to present). All stock market returns (including major markets such as the United
States, Germany, the UK, and Japan) are nonlinear, skewed, and affected to differing
degrees by the financial crisis and excessive debt, and copula functions allow us to
capture nonlinearities in the financial interdependence and cross-market linkages.
In contrast to some of the previous research (e.g., Herrera and Eichler, 2011),
our results, based on quantile dependence and other methods, suggest relatively little
interdependence between PIIGS and more financially sound economies (such as
Germany, France, and the UK). We also find that the interdependence among the
PIIGS economies is not as strong as that among European economies less likely to
face a fiscal crisis, such as France, Germany and the UK. Although interdependencies
increased during the crisis, the relative relation of lower interdependency for the
PIIGS among themselves than with the more advanced markets or for the more
advanced markets with each other continues to hold. These results suggest that
financial interdependence may be related to the level of stock market development
in various countries as proxied, for example, by market capitalization (see Table 1).
We also find that the non-EU countries tend to have lower interdependencies with
the EU countries. Notably for the pending Brexit, the UK appears to have greater
comovements with its EU counterparts than does Switzerland, despite Switzerland
sharing borders with France, Germany and Italy.
These findings are robust as they are based on several complementary metho-
dologies—namely, linear and nonlinear correlations, copulas, quantile dependence,
and lower tail dependence—and our copulas-based analysis shows that these results
are largely immune to distributional assumptions of the joint density function and to
using empirical marginal distributions.36 Our copula-based measures of dependence
36 Our bivariate dependence measures are complementary to the copula vines approach (e.g., Kurowicka
and Joe, 2010) and provide information at a more granular level: for example, the bivariate estimation
results allow each country to learn which international market(s) comove most closely with the domestic
market.
M. A. Goldstein et al./The Financial Review 54 (2019) 5–56 49
can be used in the presence of endogeneity if (as is the case in our paper) the goal is to
measure comovements without making causal statements. In addition, since our semi-
parametric and nonparametric methods do not hinge on rigid modeling assumptions,
the methodology used in this paper circumvents the omitted variables bias.
Our results for the UK, which are similar to those for France and Germany (both
in terms of comovements with PIIGS and with other advanced countries), suggest the
common currency alone does not appear to be the driving factor behind the results
reported in this paper. We also find that non-EU countries, including Switzerland,
exhibit weaker stock market comovements with EU members as compared with
the comovements among the EU nations, even in the presence of strong trade and
investment interdependencies. This finding suggests that the UK should expect lower
stock market comovements with other European nations if and when the country
implements its exit from the EU.
Our results are also consistent with some of the most recent literature that finds
no compelling evidence of financial contagion from PIIGS economies to the rest of
the euro area (e.g., Bhanot, Burns, Hunter and Williams, 2012) and a lower level of
financial interdependence among the PIIGS following the onset of the sovereign debt
crises in Europe (e.g., Tamakoshi and Hamori, 2011). Additionally, our findings can
be construed as empirical corroboration for Vasudevan’s (2010) general analytical
argument that indebted periphery countries can help mitigate, through capital flight,
the imbalances in the international monetary system. To the extent that PIIGS coun-
tries’ economic fundamentals are weaker than those in the more advanced European
countries, our results can be viewed as indirectly challenging what Bekaert, Ehrmann,
Fratzscher and Mehl (2014) refer to as “domestic contagion”—that is, the finding
that the severity of a contagion experienced by a particular country is related to the
quality of the country’s economic fundamentals. They report that domestic contagion
played a much more important role in the most recent financial crisis than cross-
country trade, banking or financial linkages. Instead, our results are in agreement
with Dungey and Gajurel (2014), who suggest that financial contagion effects are not
strongly related to a country’s level of financial integration.
Our findings on the relative shift in comovement structure pre-crisis and post-
crisis are new and augment those in Christoffersen, Errunza, Jacobs and Langlois
(2012), who use data ending in June 2009. Since our main data sample runs through
November 2013 (with the overall sample ending in September 2015), our examination
of the recovery that followed the global financial crisis uncovers an interesting and
important result not reported in Christoffersen, Errunza, Jacobs and Langlois (2012):
namely, that the most recent financial crisis caused a permanent change in the level
of stock market comovements in Europe, but the overall relative structure remained
the same and was not affected by the crisis. Finally, our results on the pre-crisis
vis-a`-vis crisis and post-crisis comparison are in line with the literature’s reports on
asymmetric correlations among financial markets during bull and bear periods (e.g.,
Ang and Bekaert, 2002). What is new and unexpected among our findings is that the
relative correlation structure among the European financial markets remained intact
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as the world economy was entering into the global financial crisis and the subsequent
recovery.
Our results are of stock market comovements (or interdependence) and not of
contagion per se, which is why we do not identify a specific mechanism via which a
contagion may spread.37 However, our analysis is related to the contagion literature
to the extent that we explicitly compare the degree of stock market comovements
during the most recent financial crisis with comovements during the pre-crisis period
and post-crisis recovery. The literature does not offer a consensus definition of con-
tagion or an agreed-upon empirical procedure to identify a contagion (e.g., Forbes
and Rigobon, 2002; Pericoli and Sbracia, 2003; Bekaert, Harvey and Ng, 2005).
Analyses of historical crisis episodes seem to draw the least amount of skepticism
with respect to contagion identification. In our study, the crisis period is also institu-
tionally determined, as most agree on the (approximate) dates of the recent financial
crisis. Among the definitions of contagion that are entertained by the literature, our
analysis is closest to the definition that identifies a contagion as a significant increase
in comovements following an onset of a crisis (see definition 4 surveyed by Pericoli
and Sbracia, 2003). In light of the empirical literature’s use of extreme negative co-
movements to identify crisis events (e.g., Rodriguez, 2007; Aloui, Aı¨ssa and Nguyen,
2011), we also compute copula-based lower tail dependence coefficients and find that
our results are robust to using this alternative approach.
The robustness section of the paper further adds to the contagion discussion. We
show that our reported structure of comovements is largely robust to controlling for
the monetary policy, interest rates, exchange rates, market uncertainty (as measured
by VIX), Fama-French risk factors, and U.S. and global factors. Although residual
comovements are somewhat lower than the comovements in raw returns, the paper’s
main results are preserved both cross-sectionally—lower comovements of the PIIGS
countries with one another than with advanced EU countries and, in turn, lower
PIIGS-advanced countries comovements than comovements of the EU advanced
countries among themselves—and across time—an increase in comovements during
the crisis without any significant reduction in the post-crisis period. Using Bekaert,
Harvey and Ng’s (2005) definition of contagion, our results indicate that the European
stock markets experienced a financial contagion during the financial crisis and that
it is too soon to speak of the comovements reverting in the direction of the pre-
crisis levels. Our results are consistent with the specific mechanisms behind the
spread of the contagion studied by Caporin, Pelizzon, Ravazzolo and Rigobon (2018)
and Fratzscher, Lo Duca and Straub (2018)—namely, that the European countries’
linkages with the United States played a role in the spread of contagion.
37 The contagion literature has explored the portfolio rebalancing channel (e.g., Kodres and Pritsker, 2002),
the wealth effect channel (e.g., Kyle and Xiong, 2001; Yuan, 2005) and the common creditor channel (e.g.,
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000; Broner, Gelos and Reinhart, 2006) of financial crisis transmission. There
are also behavioral explanations, such as herd behavior, that are inherently difficult to capture in a formal
framework.
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Our paper also has important implications for international portfolio diversifica-
tion. In particular, we show that contrary to the conventional wisdom, the stock market
comovements across the EU did not go down significantly in the post-crisis period.
Additionally, we report that the comovements among the advanced EU countries
are higher than the comovements between the advanced and peripheral economies,
and that this relative structure has been preserved over time. These results cannot be
attributed to the common macroeconomic, market, or Fama-French factors.
Finally, while it is impossible to predict precisely what will happen when Brexit
concludes, our results may shed some light on what the UK may experience as it
moves from being part of the EU to being a non-EU country. In particular, the non-
EU results found that while the global structure generally remained similar, the UK’s
comovements with the major and minor EU countries were similar but generally
stronger than those of Switzerland, a non-EU member located centrally in Europe.
Therefore, as the UK leaves the EU, it is possible that its stock market comovements
may become more similar to those of Switzerland.
Appendix A
Copula models allow researchers to study dependence structures of bivariate and
multivariate distributions. A joint distribution function contains information on both
the marginal distributions of the individual variables and the dependence structure
between the variables, and copula methodology allows one to separate the marginals
from the dependence structures. An m-dimensional copula, commonly denoted as
C(u1, . . . , um), is a joint distribution function on [0, 1]m with all marginal distribu-
tions being standard uniform.
Sklar’s (1959) theorem provides the theoretical underpinnings for most copula-
based analyses. Let F be a joint distribution function and Fj , j = 1, . . . , m be
the marginal distributions. Then there exists a copula C : [0, 1]m → [0, 1] such
that F (x1, . . . , xm) = C(F1(x1), . . . , Fm(xm)) for all x1, . . . , xm in [−∞,∞]. If the
marginals are continuous, C is unique. Otherwise, C is uniquely determined on
RanF1 × . . . × RanFm, where RanFj = Fj ([−∞,∞]) is the range of Fj . Con-
versely, if C is a copula and F1, . . . , Fm are univariate distribution functions,
then F (x1, . . . , xm) is a joint distribution function with marginal distributions Fj ,
j = 1, . . . , m. Thus, Sklar’s (1959) theorem claims that (1) a copula can be derived
from any joint distribution functions, and (2) any copula can be combined with any set
of marginal distributions to produce a multivariate distribution function. Put simply,
copulas join (or “couple”) marginal distributions into a joint distribution.
Stock returns for each country are transformed into the uniform [0, 1] distribu-
tion using the probability integral transformation
∫ +∞
−∞ p(x)dx = 1, where p(x) is
the probability of x. Next, suppose y is related to x such that y = ∫ x−∞ p(x)dx,
where y is an ordered function of x and 0 < y < 1. Then p(x) = p(y) dx
dy
= 1.
Given uniform [0, 1] distributions u and v for data series x and y, respectively,
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C(u, v) = Fxy(F−1x (u), F−1y (v)), where C(u, v) is the copula, Fxy is the joint cu-
mulative density function, and F−1x and F−1y are the inverse rank order functions
(Skoglund, 2010). The copula estimates are computed for a given joint cumulative
density function. Below, we discuss the types of copulas and dependence measures
used in our analysis.
A.1. Gaussian normal copula
We begin with a copula based on the Gaussian Normal distribution. Let uj ∼
U (0, 1) for j = 1, . . . , m, where U (0, 1) represents the uniform distribution on the
[0, 1] interval. Let∑ be the positive semidefinite correlation matrix with m(m − 1)/2
parameters. The Gaussian Normal copula can be written as
C (u1, u2, . . . , um) = 	
(
	−1 (u1) ,	−1 (u2) , . . . , 	−1 (um)
)
,
where 	 is the distribution function of a standard normal random variable and 	 is
the m-variate standard normal distribution with mean vector 0 and covariance matrix
. That is, the distribution 	 is Nm(0, ).
A.2. Student’s t copula
We next turn to a copula based on the Student’s t distribution. Specifically, let

 = {(ν,) : ν ∈ (1,∞),  ∈ Rm×m} and let tν be a univariate t distribution with ν
degrees of freedom. The Student’s t copula can be written as
C
 (u1, u2, . . . , um) = tν,
(
t−1ν (u1) , t−1ν (u2) , . . . , t−1ν (um)
)
,
where tν, is the multivariate Student’s t distribution with a correlation matrix  and
ν degrees of freedom.
A.3. Archimedean copulas
We next turn to three types of Archimedean copulas examined for our anal-
yses: Clayton, Frank, and Gumbel. Let function φ : [0, 1] → [0,∞) be a strict
Archimedean copula generator function, and assume that φ is decreasing and that φ−1
is completely monotonic on [0,∞).38 In general, an Archimedean copula (Clayton,
Frank or Gumbel) is defined as
C (u1, u2, . . . , um) = φ−1 (φ (u1) , φ (u2) , . . . , φ (um)) .
38 A strict generator is a decreasing function φ : [0, 1] → [0,∞) such that φ(0) = ∞ and φ(1) = 0. A
decreasing function f (t) : [a, b] → (−∞,∞) is completely monotonic if
(−1)k d
k
dtk
f (t) ≥ 0, k ∈ N, t ∈ (a, b) .
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Clayton copula
Let the generator function φ(u) = θ−1(u−θ − 1). A Clayton copula is defined
as
Cθ (u1, u2, . . . , um) =
[
m∑
i=1
u−θi − m + 1
]− 1
θ
with θ > 0.
Frank copula
With the generator function φ(u) = −log[ e−θu−1
e−θ−1 ], a Frank copula is defined as
Cθ (u1, u2, . . . , um) = 1
θ
log
[
1 +
∏m
i=1
(
e−θui − 1)(
e−θ − 1)m−1
]
with θ ∈ (−∞,∞) \ {0} for m = 2 and θ > 0 for m ≥ 3.
Gumbel copula
Finally, if the generation φ(u) = (−log(u))θ , a Gumbel copula is defined as
Cθ (u1, u2, . . . , um) = exp
⎡
⎣−
[
m∑
i=1
(−log (ui))θ
] 1
θ
⎤
⎦
with θ > 1 (see, e.g., SAS Institute Inc., 2011).
A.3.1. Measure of concordance. Kendall’s tau can be defined as the covariance
between the sign statistic of X1 − ˜X1 and X2 − ˜X2, where ( ˜X1, ˜X2) is an independent
copy of (X1, X2):
ρτ ≡ E
[
sign
(
X1 − ˜X1
) (
X2 − ˜X2
)]
.
Spearman’s rho is the correlation between the transformed random variables, which
(after the transformation by their distribution functions) are uniformly distributed on
[0, 1]:
ρS (X1, X2) ≡ ρ (F1 (x1) , F2 (x2)) .
Thus, if X1 and X2 cluster around any monotonically increasing function, both
Kendall’s tau and Spearman’s rho will register a rank correlation of 1. In contrast, a
Pearson coefficient will register a perfect correlation only if X1 and X2 cluster around
an increasing linear function.
A.3.2. Quantile dependence. Quantile dependence allows us to measure comove-
ments for various return quantiles. Following Patton (2012), we define lower quantile
dependence as
λLq = Pr(U1 ≤ q,U2 ≤ q) /q, q ∈ (0, 0.5]
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and upper quantile dependence as
λUq = Pr(U1 > q,U2 > q) /(1 − q), q ∈ [0.5, 1) .
A.3.3. Lower and upper tail dependence. If (X, Y ) is a vector of random variables
with marginal distribution functions F and G such that F−1(t) = x(t) and G−1(t) =
y(t), then lower tail dependence λLC is defined as
λLC = lim
t→0+
Pr[Y ≤ y(t) | X ≤ x(t)].
This measure of extreme negative comovements depends only on the copula of the
two variables and can be computed as
λLC = lim
t→0+
C(t, t)
t
= δ′C(0+),
where δ′C(t) is the derivative of the copula’s diagonal (Nelsen, 2006). In our com-
putation of λLC , we rely on empirical copulas. λLC = 0 would indicate no lower tail
dependence. The higher the λLC , the greater the extreme negative comovements.
For completeness, we also study the upper tail dependence λUC , which is defined
and computed similarly to λLC :
λUC = lim
t→1−
Pr[Y > y(t) | X > x(t)]
and
λUC = lim
t→1−
1 − 2t − C(t, t)
1 − t = 2 − δ
′
C(1−)
(see, e.g., Nelsen, 2006; Joe, 2014).
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